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Cost-effective high reliability can be achieved in future space life support systems 
through careful systems analysis and design. This paper outlines a comprehensive approach. 
Potential future human space missions are described. The mission parameter impacts on life 
support system design and reliability requirements are discussed. Not all human space 
missions require high reliability life support. The potential reliability and cost of storage and 
of recycling life support systems are investigated. Simple storage systems can provide cost-
effective high reliability life support where it is needed. More complex recycling systems 
with lower reliability and higher cost can be used when suitable.  
Nomenclature 
AMCM = Advanced Missions Cost Model 
BVAD = Baseline Values and Assumptions Document 
CDRA = Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly 
CM  = Crewmember 
COPV = Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel 
CRS = Carbon Dioxide Reduction System 
DDT&E = Design, Development, Test and Evaluation 
IOC = Initial Operation Capability 
ISRU = In Situ Resource Utilization 
ISS = International Space Station 
LCC = Life Cycle Cost 
LEO  = Low Earth Orbit 
LiOH  = Lithium hydroxide 
MOCM = Mission Operations Cost Model 
MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure  
OGS = Oxygen Generation System 
ORU = Orbital Replacement Unit 
UPA = Urine Processor Assembly 
WPA = Water Processor Assembly 
I. Introduction 
CHIEVING cost-effective high reliability in space life support will require careful systems analysis and 
reliability design optimization. A system’s reliability is the probability it will operate satisfactorily over some 
specified duration. Brief interruptions, repairs, or degraded operation may be acceptable. The ultimate design and 
development objective is achieving the required reliability throughout the mission. Before the mission, engineering 
should determine the expected reliability and establish a strong and convincing basis for believing it will be 
achieved.  
How can sufficient reliability in life support be achieved at acceptable cost for future human space missions? 
What are the potential future human space missions? This mission question leads to further system design questions. 
What is sufficient reliability? What is acceptable cost? The answers depend on mission requirements, system design 
options, technical constraints, and engineering capability. Expected reliability numbers can be as undependable as 
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optimistic best case projections for untested systems or as solid as consistent extensive flight data. Confidence in 
predictions depends on the intrinsic nature and operational experience with the system.  
II. Future human space missions 
This section considers potential future human space missions and the mission parameter impacts on life support 
design.  
A. Potential future missions 
What are the potential future human space missions? What are the mission parameters that affect life support 
design, especially the requirements, approaches, and cost of life support system reliability? Table 1 lists possible 
missions and the key parameters.  
 
Table 1. Missions and parameters affecting life support reliability requirements and design. 
 Transit to LEO 
Transit 
to moon 
Transit 
to Mars 
Transit 
to sun 
orbit 
Residence 
in LEO 
Residence 
on moon 
Residence 
on Mars 
Residence 
in sun orbit 
Duration minutes to hours 
2-3 
days 
200-300 
days 
hours to 
100’s of 
days 
100’s of 
days 
days to 
indefinite 
weeks to 
indefinite 
years to 
indefinite 
Emergency 
crew return hours days 
100’s of 
days 
100’s of 
days hours days 
100’s of 
days 
100’s of 
days 
Gravity, g 0 0 0 or 1 0 or 1 0 or 1 1/6 1/3 1 
Planetary 
material none none none none none lunar Martian none 
 
A transit to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) requires only minutes, but rendezvous with an orbiting space station might 
take hours. In an emergency in LEO, the crew should be able to return to Earth a few hours. A transit to lunar orbit 
or surface requires a few days. The crew should be able to return to Earth in a similar time. A transit to Mars 
requires 200 to 300 days, and a crew cannot return except when Earth and Mars are in the correct orbital positions. 
Mars transit missions are often expected to be in 0 g, but this would nearly certainly be very debilitating to the 
astronauts. Rotating or partially rotating Mars transit spacecraft have been proposed to provide artificial gravity. 
Space settlements orbiting the sun have been suggested. They could leave the Earth-moon system in a few hours but 
would spend a long time far from Earth.  
Platforms in LEO can be inhabited indefinitely and the International Space Station (ISS) may be used for 
decades. However, because of the damaging effects of 0 g, individual astronauts residence time should be limited 
limited to six months to a year. Rotating spacecraft have been suggested to provide an artificial gravity of 1 g. 
Residence on the moon or Mars could be similarly unlimited in time, but the possible harmful effects of their partial 
gravity are unknown. Rapid emergency crew return is possible from LEO and the lunar surface, but not from Mars. 
Space settlements orbiting the sun are expected to rotate to provide an artificial 1 g, because of the necessary long 
duration of crew residence.  
B. Mission impacts on life support system design  
The mission parameters suggest future life support design options, as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Possible life support design approaches for different missions.  
 Transit to LEO 
Transit 
to moon 
Transit 
to Mars 
Transit 
to sun 
orbit 
Residence 
in LEO 
Residence 
on moon 
Residence 
on Mars 
Residence 
in sun orbit 
Storage X X X X     
Resupply     X X X X 
Recycling, 
processing   X  X X X X 
ISRU      X X  
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The required life support materials include oxygen, water, and food. Removal of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere and human waste handling are also necessary. Future life support systems can provide life support 
material using initial storage, scheduled resupply, recycling systems, or in situ resource utilization (ISRU), which 
may obtain oxygen, hydrogen, and water from planetary resources. Carbon dioxide removal can similarly use a 
stored or supplied material, lithium hydroxide (LiOH), to remove carbon dioxide or can use processing and 
recycling systems.  
All the brief transit missions should probably use storage. The long Mars transit mission can use storage or 
recycling or both. All the long residence missions can use resupply, recycling, or both. The long planetary surface 
missions can also use ISRU.  
C. Mission determinants of the failure rate requirement 
High life support reliability is required for the time period until the crew can be resupplied or can return to Earth 
or possibly a safe haven. The mission parameters of transit time, duration, and emergency crew return time 
determine how long such high reliability is required. The high reliability duration requirements for different 
missions are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Life support high mission reliability duration requirements for different missions.  
 Transit to LEO 
Transit 
to moon 
Transit 
to Mars 
Transit to 
sun orbit 
Residence 
in LEO 
Residence 
on moon 
Residence 
on Mars 
Residence in 
sun orbit 
O2 hours days 100’s of days days hours days 
100’s of 
days 100’s of days 
CO2  days 100’s of days days  days 
100’s of 
days 
100’s of days 
H2O  days 100’s of days days  days 
100’s of 
days 
100’s of days 
Food   100’s of days    
100’s of 
days 
100’s of days 
 
The purpose of life support is to keep the crew alive and healthy, and to do it reliably. A life support failure can 
endanger the crew. Failures of different life support functions endanger the crew more or less rapidly. A loss of 
atmosphere can be fatal in minutes. It may take hours or days for oxygen to be consumed or carbon dioxide to build 
up to dangerous levels, depending on the volume of atmosphere per crewmember. People can survive a few days 
without water and a few weeks without food. To ensure a high probability that the crew will survive a transit or 
emergency return, the life support system must have a low probability of failure during their maximum duration.  
III. Mission and life support reliability requirements 
This section considers overall mission and life support system reliability requirements.  
A. Mission reliability duration requirement and life support system failure rate 
Suppose that an entire life support system has an expected operating life of 10 years, with most failing 
subsystems quickly repaired or replaced. The Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is 10 years and the failure fate per 
year is f = 1/MTBF = 0.1 or 10% per year, assuming a constant failure rate. During a 3 day transit or return delay, 
the probability of failure, F = 0.1/year * 3 days/365 days per year = 0.0008 or less than 0.1% over the required time. 
The assumed system has high reliability for a lunar transit mission.  
However, suppose that the same system is used for transit to Mars, or waiting for an emergency resupply on 
Mars, or on an emergency return from Mars or a solar orbiting platform. These might require 200 days. During that 
time, the probability of failure, F = 0.1 * 200 days/365 days per year = 0.055 or 5.5% over the required time. This 
assumed system has far too low reliability for a Mars transit or emergency return mission.  
Longer mission reliability duration requirements require a lower failure rate for a single life support system to 
achieve an acceptable Probability Of Loss of Crew, Pr(LOC). Instead of redesigning the life support system for 
higher reliability, it is possible to provide several redundant full life support systems.  
Suppose three systems are provided for a planetary base or orbiting station, and that one is used and two are in 
storage. The probability of lacking life support is the probability that all three fail in less than 200 days. A crude 
upper bound estimate of the probability that all three fail is (0.055)3 = 0.00017 or 0.02%. A triply redundant system 
probably has sufficient reliability for a Mars transit or emergency return mission. [The estimated failure rate is an 
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upper bound because a system has a failure probability of F = 0.055 only if it is operating over the 200 days. The 
waiting spares will be in storage and probably have a much lower failure rate.] One operating and one stored system 
would have a crude upper bound probability that both fail of (0.055)2 = 0.0030 or 0.3%.  
In some cases, longer or shorter high reliability periods durations would be needed. A long surface stay Mars 
mission could take 400 to 550 days before the planned return, and earlier resupply or crew return would not be 
possible.  
B. What is sufficient overall mission reliability?  
Even the smallest risk to the crew seems too much, but some risk is inevitable and risk must be handled 
professionally. The engineering objective should be to reduce risk as much as required in a reasonable, ethical, and 
cost-effective way.  
Important guidelines are the level of risk that has been accepted in the past and the level that is anticipated in 
future missions. After the Challenger tragedy, the Pr(LOC) for a shuttle launch was estimated at about 1 in 100. The 
number of planned launches was greatly reduced but launches to construct the International Space Station (ISS) 
continued even after the Columbia accident further demonstrated the high risk. Eventually 1 in 100 was considered 
too high a risk and the shuttle program was terminated. Some have hoped that future missions will have an overall 
Pr(LOC) of 1 in 1,000 or less. On the other hand, the Apollo program was thought to have much higher risk, with 
probably several failures before a successful moon landing. A Mars mission may be t important enough to justify an 
overall Pr(LOC) of 1 in 10. Preventing a large asteroid an asteroid impacting Earth would justify very high risk. 
C. What is sufficient life support reliability?  
Life support is not a particularly high risk activity compared to launch, ExtraVehicular Activity (EVA), and 
landing, so it should account for only a small portion of the overall mission Pr(LOC), perhaps one-tenth of a mission 
Pr(LOC) of 1 in 1,000 or 1 in 10,000. The life support Pr(LOC) must then be allocated between the life support 
subfunctions such as oxygen, carbon dioxide removal, water, food, and fire suppression. Each particular function 
would then have a failure probability of less than 1 in 100,000, or 0.00001.  
Over a 200 day high reliability period, the failure rate would be 0.00001/(200/365) = 0.000018 per year. This is 
less than one failure in 50,000 years. Such high reliability is extremely difficult to achieve and impossible to 
measure by life testing. Assuming a theoretical constant failure rate extending out to 50,000 years, testing long 
enough to see a single failure would require testing 5,000 units for 10 years.  
A drastic reduction in the reliability requirement may be necessary. Suppose the mission Pr(LOC) = 0.1, the life 
support system Pr(LOC) = 0.01, and the life support subsystem Pr(LOC) = 0.001, all a factor of 100 higher than 
above. Over a 200 day high reliability period, the failure rate would be 0.0018 per year. Each life support subsystem 
would have less than one failure in 500 years, and the overall system less than one in 50 years.  
It is important that Pr(LOC) includes only unrepairable failures fatal to the crew, not minor failures that do not 
impact major functions and not even large scale failures that can be repaired or recovered from using redundant 
units.  
D. What is an acceptable cost for a high reliability life support system? 
There are several ways to consider cost. Most directly, the expenditure should be whatever is needed to achieve 
the performance and reliability needed, using the most cost-effective approach.  
Developing the ISS cost about $100 billion, with another $50 billion for shuttle launch, while the ISS recycling 
life support system cost about $1 or 2 billion. This suggests that recycling life support for a long mission might cost 
about one percent of the total mission cost. Developing the ISS recycling life support was justified as saving the cost 
of launching oxygen, water, and other resupply material. This suggests that a recycling system should be used if it 
costs less than resupply. Now that the space shuttle launch cost has been significantly reduced, by about a factor of 
twenty, the cost for recycling that can be justified by saving launch cost is much lower. The ISS life support system 
does not have or require high reliability, since quick emergency resupply or crew return are possible.  
Reliability performance and cost should be allocated so they are optimized over the entire mission. The cost-
effective way to improve reliability is to transfer reliability effort from areas where reliability is most difficult to 
improve to areas where it is easier to improve. The objective is to obtain the lowest mission Pr(LOC) for the lowest 
reliability cost. If life support can improve overall reliability at lower cost than other mission systems, its funding 
and reliability requirement should be increased.  
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E. What is the cost of a life support failure? 
The cost of a failure that causes fatalities goes far beyond what can be measured by any dollar amount. 
Accepting any defined Pr(LOC) is difficult but rationally considering can produce better results than ignoring or 
denying human risk. Another possible consequence of a life support failure is loss of mission, and an upper bound 
on Pr(LOM) can reasonably be set much higher than on Pr(LOC).  
The dollar cost of reliability can be estimated. However, making a coldly rational, cost-based reliability analysis 
is very difficult even for unmanned missions. This was shown by the failure and criticism of NASA’s better, faster, 
cheaper initiative. Mission costs were cut, reliability effort was reduced, many more missions were flown, and 
several succeeded before the last two failed. Defenders argue that better, faster, cheaper flew more missions, gained 
more scientific results, and produced more engineering knowledge than the traditional approach. But the highly 
publicized failures, one due to confusing English and metric units, made NASA look incompetent.  
Even minor  and easily repairable failures can have high cost. If there is an unexpectedly high number of life 
support failures, as there were in ISS, much more than the expected crew time must be expended on maintenance 
and repairs. Then the crew is much less available for scientific and industrial experiments. The ISS crew time can 
reasonably be assigned a very high cost. Suppose the main purpose of the ISS is to have astronauts do research and 
development. Suppose that even though the experiments and systems require design and development, launch, 
ground support, and post-flight analysis, all these costs can be neglected. Then the only significant cost would be 
astronaut time. The ISS cost $150 billion for design and launch, and had 4 crew for 18 years, for about 75 man-
years. The cost of astronaut time would be $2 billion per man-year, and at 2,000 hours per man-year, $1 million per 
hour. Significantly increasing the $1 or 2 billion cost of the life support system to improve its reliability would have 
been a good investment. The different management and separate budgets of design and operations make it difficult 
to spend development dollars to save operations dollars.  
IV. Life support storage and resupply analysis 
The storage and resupply analysis includes the crew life support requirements, the stored material system 
masses, and the required spares.  
A. Life support material mass required 
Table 4 shows the crew life support material requirements and the waste produced in kilograms per 
crewmember-day (kg/CM-d).  
 
Table 4. Minimum life support system requirements and resulting waste streams, kg/CM-d.  
Crew requirements Crew wastes 
 
Oxygen and food 
 
Carbon 
dioxide  1.00 
Crew oxygen 0.84 
 
Food solids 0.62 
Food water 
content 1.15 
Water supply  Waste water 
Food preparation 
water 0.75 
Respiration and perspiration 
condensate 2.28 
Drinking water 1.62 Urine and flush water 2.00 
Urine flush water 0.5 Used wash water 1.29 
Wash water 1.29   
Total water supply 4.16 Total waste water 5.57 
Total crew inputs 6.77 Total crew outputs 6.57 
 
These minimum requirements are based on early space station planning, except that showers, dish washing, and 
most crew hygiene water have been eliminated. (Reed and Coulter, 2000) (Wieland, 1994) The waste streams 
include carbon dioxide and additional water produced from food by the crew metabolism.  
B. Storage and resupply masses  
A storage or resupply life support system provides oxygen and water in storage tanks. Carbon dioxide is 
removed using lithium hydroxide (LiOH). The oxygen and water for a long period are provided in multiple small 
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tanks. About 0.4 kg of tank mass is required per kg of oxygen (BVAD, p. 31) A space qualified oxygen tank weighs 
12.7 kg and contains 35.4 kg of oxygen. 0.36 kg tank mass per kg of oxygen. (Orbital DS436, 2016) Using the 0.4 
ratio, the total of oxygen and tank mass is 1.14 kg/crewmember-day.  
About 0.2 kg of tank mass is required per kg of water. (ILO, 1991, p. 99) A space station water tank weighs 21.2 
kg and holds 103 kg of water. (Carrasquillo, Reuter and Philistine, 1997)  
LiOH is provided in multiple canisters. About 1.1 kg of LiOH is chemically required to remove the 1.0 kg of 
carbon dioxide per crewmember per day. (Eckart, 1996, p. 192) The ISS LiOH canister provides about 1.5 kg/ 
kg/crewmember-day of LiOH. (Matty, 2008) The filled shuttle LiOH canister weighed 7 kg and was rated at 4 
crewmember-days, so the required resupply mass of LiOH plus canister is 1.75 kg/crewmember-day. (Doll and 
Eckart, 1996, pp. 553-4) The mass of the canister alone is estimated to be about 20 percent of the 7 kg or 1.4 kg.  
Table 5 lists the resupply masses and number of containers required.  
 
Table 5. Resupply masses and containers for oxygen, water, and LiOH.  
Material Material mass, 
kg/CM-d 
Container, 
kg/CM-d 
Material and 
container, 
kg/CM-d 
200 CM-d 
material mass, 
kg 
Container 
capacity, kg 
# containers 
for 200 days 
Oxygen 0.84 0.30 1.14 168 35.4 4.7 
Water 4.16 0.83 4.99 832 103 8.1 
LiOH 1.40 0.35 1.75 280 5.6 50.0 
Totals 6.40 1.48 7.88 1,280     
C. Reliability and spares for storage and resupply 
Suppose a highly reliable life support system is required for 200 days, in a situation where earlier emergency 
resupply or crew return is not possible. A storage or scheduled resupply system would provide oxygen and water in 
tanks and LiOH in cannisters. Can storage achieve a 200 day Pr(LOC) of 0.001, 0.0001, or 0.00001 for each 
material?  
Composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) have been used to store oxygen in most spacecraft, for 
propulsion and for atmosphere in human spacecraft. They have been highly reliable. The analysis of the accelerated 
life testing on a used NASA shuttle COPV tank found an estimated life of 350 years for the worst used shuttle tank 
the testers could obtain. This would indicate the probability of a tank failure is about 1/350 = 0.0028 per year. 
(Jones, 2017-89)  
For a required duration of 200 days, the probability of any tank failing can be estimated as 200 days/365 days per 
year * (1/350 years) = 0.0016. The five required oxygen tanks will have five times this failure probability, nearly 
one percent. As this does not meet the least difficult reliability requirement for a failure probability of less than 
0.001, spare oxygen tanks are needed. 
This is an “r out of n” redundancy problem, since r out of the n total tanks must not fail. The reliability and 
failure probability are found using the binomial distribution. For general r and n, the system reliability, R, is the 
probability that r, r+1, … up to n subsystems survive to time t. This is the cumulative binomial distribution from i = 
r to n. Using a sufficient number of spares, s = n – r, any theoretical reliability can be attained. The additional cost 
for the higher reliability is the cost of supplying the filled spare tanks. 
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Table 6 shows the number of containers and spares for oxygen, water, and LiOH needed to meet different 
Pr(LOC) requirements. 
 
   Table 6. Number of resupply spare containers to meet different Pr(LOC) requirements.  
r s n = r + s Pr (LOC) Pr (LOC) 
Pr(LOC) 
requirement met Pr(LOC) less than 
oxygen 
5 0 5 0.007974 8.0E-03     
5 1 6 0.000038 3.8E-05 < 0.0001 1.0E-04 
5 2 7 0.000000 1.4E-07 < 0.000001 1.0E-06 
water 
9 0 9 0.014308 1.4E-02     
 9 1 10 0.000114 1.1E-04 < 0.001 1.0E-03 
9 2 11 0.000001 6.7E-07 < 0.000001 1.0E-06 
LiOH  
50 0 50 0.076943 7.7E-02     
50 1 51 0.003098 3.1E-03     
50 2 52 0.000085 8.5E-05 < 0.0001 1.0E-04 
50 3 53 0.000002 1.8E-06 < 0.00001 1.0E-05 
 
Five oxygen tanks have a Pr(LOC) of 0.0080 on a 200 day mission. Adding one spare reduces the Pr(LOC) to 
0.00004 and adding two spares reduces it to much less than one in a million. As a conservative overestimate, the 
failure probability of a water tank or LiOH cannister was set equal to the failure probability of an oxygen tank. 
Water tanks are expected to have better reliability since they use simpler technology and are not under pressure. 
Nine water tanks have a Pr(LOC) of 0.014 on a 200 day mission. Adding one spare reduces the Pr(LOC) to 0.00011 
and adding two spares reduces it to less than one in a million. The Apollo 13 experience showed that a LiOH 
container can actually be built in flight using cardboard and duct tape. It is hard to imagine an unrecoverable LiOH 
cannister failure. Using the doubtless much higher failure probability of an oxygen tank for the LiOH container, 50 
cannisters would have a Pr(LOC) of 0.077 on a 200 day mission. Adding two spares reduces the Pr(LOC) to 
0.000085 and adding three spares reduces it to almost one in a million.  
Such very low probabilities of a container failure consider only intrinsic failure modes. The probability of an 
accident causing a failure, due to an environmental impact or human error, can be significant. Possibly additional 
spares should be provided.   
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Life support recycling analysis 
The analysis describes the ISS life support system and its expected reliability and computes the required spares.  
A. The ISS recycling life support system 
 
The ISS life support system is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The ISS life support system.  
 
The ISS life support system contains atmosphere, water, and waste recycling processors. The four bed molecular 
sieve carbon dioxide removal system is designed to allow the carbon dioxide to be vented to space or to be delivered 
to the Sabatier carbon dioxide reduction system. The electrolysis oxygen generator provides oxygen directly to the 
cabin atmosphere. The hydrogen it produces can be vented overboard or used for carbon dioxide reduction.  
Waste hygiene water and cabin condensate is stored and routed through the potable water processor to a potable 
storage tank. Resupply water delivered by Progress or other resupply vehicles is usually run through the water 
processor before potable use. Urine is pumped from the urinal to the urine processor and the distillate is combined 
with other wastewater. The commode bags and compacts feces. Solid wastes and feces are usually loaded into 
Progress and burned up during Earth reentry. (Diamant and Humphries, 1990) (Carrasquillo and Bertotto, 1999) 
(Bagdigian and Ogle, 2001) Table 7 lists the life support recycling system masses.  
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Table 7. Recycling system masses per crewmember. 
System # crew-members Total mass, kg Mass/CM, kg/CM 
Carbon dioxide removal 4 201 50.3 
Carbon dioxide reduction 4 18 4.5 
Oxygen generation 7 113 16.1 
Water processing 10 476 47.6 
Urine processing 8 128 16.0 
 
The number of crew members supported and the system masses are from (Carrasquillo, Reuter and Philistine, 
1997) except that the carbon dioxide reduction system is from (Eckart, 1996, p. 197) and (ARC, 1990).  
B. The ISS Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs)  
The ISS maintenance approach uses spare subsystems, called Orbital Replacement Units, (ORUs). The ISS 
typically has on board one or two spares for each ORU. Even if an operating ORU has a 95% chance of working 
throughout the expected ISS mission duration, a spare would be needed to ensure higher than 95% reliability. In this 
case there is a 95% chance that the spare will never be needed. Spares are for insurance, not expected use.  
Typically one or two spares are needed for the ISS operating close to Earth, with its lower reliability 
requirement. Using a similar system in a higher reliability application far from Earth would tend to increase the 
number of spares, but a shorter mission duration would tend to reduce them.  
C. Reliability and spares for recycling  
Again suppose a highly reliable life support system is required for 200 days. Consider a system similar to ISS, 
recycling water and oxygen and removing carbon dioxide. As was done with resupply, the recycling systems will be 
provided with spares to achieve a 200 day Pr(LOC) of 0.001, 0.0001, or 0.00001 for each of the five recycling 
systems in Table 7.   
The calculation of the number of spares required for active recycling systems differs from that for storage tanks. 
Storage tanks are in use until they are emptied or fail. For recycling life support ORU’s, the spares are simply stored. 
Only one unit is operating and the off-line spares have a negligible failure rate. The probability of a given number of 
failures using cold spares is given by the Poisson distribution. It is used here to compute the number of spares 
needed to have a less than the required probability of not having a needed spare.  
The life support system is required to operate at high reliability for mission length L =200 days. The subsystem 
major components each have an expected Mean Time Before Failure, (MTBF), the time until it is expected to fail. 
The failure rate, f = 1/MTBF, is the number of times the component is expected to fail per year. The number of 
failures from time 0 to time t is n(t) and has a Poisson probability distribution function (pdf).  
The Poisson pdf gives the probability, for failure rate f = 1/MTBF, that there will be exactly n(t) = x failures in 
time t. 
Poisson pdf [n(t) = x] = (f * t)x e –f * t /x! 
 
The Poisson distribution’s mean value, which is the expected number of failures during the mission of length L, 
is f * L = L/MTBF. The probability of n(t) or fewer failures is the summation of the Poisson pdf from x equals 0 to 
n(t). The probability of n(t) or more failures is the summation of the pdf from n(t) to the total number of units. The 
Poisson distribution is used to compute how many spares are required to have less than a defined probability of 
having all units fail.  
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The computation of numbers of spares is given in Appendix A. Table 8 gives the mass weighted average number 
of spare ORU’s for each of the ISS systems that are required to achieve the different Pr(LOC) requirements.  
 
  Table 8. Number of recycling system spares to meet different Pr(LOC) requirements.  
System n = 1 + s Pr (LOC) Pr (LOC) Pr(LOC) requirement met Pr(LOC) less than 
Oxygen Generation System (OGS) 
 3.04 0.000913 9.1E-04 <0.001 1.0E-03 
 3.74 0.000067 6.7E-05 <0.0001 1.0E-04 
 4.39 0.0000083 8.3E-06 <0.00001 1.0E-05 
Carbon dioxide Removal Assembly(CDRA)  
 2.91 0.000588 5.9E-04 <0.001 1.0E-03 
 3.26 0.000093 9.3E-05 <0.0001 1.0E-04 
 3.89 0.0000077 7.7E-06 <0.00001 1.0E-05 
Carbon dioxide Reduction System (CRS) (estimated) 
 3.05   <0.001 1.0E-03 
 3.71   <0.0001 1.0E-04 
 4.26   <0.00001 1.0E-05 
Water Processor Assembly (WPA) 
 2.97 0.000835 8.3E-04 <0.001 1.0E-03 
 3.77 0.000042 4.2E-05 <0.0001 1.0E-04 
 4.12 0.0000079 7.9E-06 <0.00001 1.0E-05 
Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) 
 3.27 0.000957 9.6E-04 <0.001 1.0E-03 
 4.09 0.000079 7.9E-05 <0.0001 1.0E-04 
 4.64 0.0000096 9.6E-06 <0.00001 1.0E-05 
 
Typically 3, increasing to nearly 5, redundant subsystems are needed achieve a 200 day Pr(LOC) of 0.001, 
0.0001, or 0.00001 for the different systems. If all five systems have a Pr(LOC) < 0.001, the overall recycling 
Pr(LOC) is <0.005.  
V. Life Cycle Cost (LCC) analysis 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) includes all the costs incurred during the three phases of a space mission: development, 
launch and emplacement, and operations.  
A. Development cost 
Development cost includes DDT&E (Design, Development, Test, and Engineering) and hardware production. 
Development cost can be estimated using the Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM). The model is a single 
equation using mass, quantity, mission type, number of design generations, and technical difficulty to estimate the 
total cost for DDT&E and production.  
The AMCM formula for the cost of DDT&E and production in millions of 1999 dollars is:  
 
 Cost = 5.65 * 10 - 4 Q 0.59 M 0.66 80.6 S (3.81 * 10 - 55) (1/(IOC-1900) B -0.36 1.57 D 
 
Q is the total quantity of development and production units, M is the system dry mass in pounds, S is the 
specification according to the type of mission (2.13 for human habitat, 2.39 for planetary base, 2.46 for crewed 
planetary lander), IOC is the year of initial operation capability, B is the block or hardware design generation (1 
for new design, 2 for second generation), and D is the estimated difficulty (0 for average, 2.5 for extremely 
difficult, and -2.5 for extremely easy). (Guerra and Shishko, 2000, pp. 946-7)  
B. Launch cost 
The Falcon 9 has reduced the launch cost to LEO to $2.7 k/kg. The Falcon Heavy further reduces the cost to $1.4 
k/kg. (Spacex.com, 2018) The emplaced mission costs per kg of payload are much higher than for LEO. The mass 
that must be placed in LEO includes the rockets and propulsion mass needed to take a surface payload to the moon 
or Mars or to take a round trip payload to the moon or Mars and back to Earth. A rocket’s stack-to-payload mass 
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ratio or gear ratio is the total mass needed in LEO (payload mass plus rocket mass plus propulsion mass) to the 
payload mass. To send a system from LEO to Mars and let it be aero-captured into Mars orbit has a gear ratio of 3.6. 
Mars landing would be by parachute, not propulsive, so the gear ratio does not increase. To take a system out of 
Mars orbit and sent it back toward Earth and be aero-captured has a gear ratio of 3.4. Assuming that aero-capture 
has no propulsion cost, the gear ratio of Mars orbit round trip payload is 3.6 * 3.4 = 12.2. (Condon et al., 2000, pp. 
276-8) Half the resupply mass is used on the transit to Mars and the other half on the return trip, so the average gear 
ratio can be used for the total mass. The mission launch cost is set at $10,000/kg, based on the Falcon Heavy cost of 
$1,400/kg and an average Mars gear ratio of roughly 7.  
C. Operations cost  
The space operations phase of most human missions has been short, but ISS and possibly a future lunar surface 
base will operate for more than a decade. Future operations costs are usually estimated as a percentage of the 
development cost per year. For the shuttle, the ten year operations costs (really launch costs for shuttle) were 58% of 
the total cost and development costs were 42%, so that the yearly operations cost was (0.58/0.42)/10 or 13.8% of 
development cost per year. For ISS, the ten year operations costs were 51% of the total cost and development cost 
was 49%, so that the yearly operations cost was (0.51/0.49)/10) or 10.4% of development cost per year, not 
including launch. (Guerra and Shishko, 2000, p. 938) The JSC Mission Operations Cost Model (MOCM) estimates 
the operations cost per year as 10.9% of the total development and production cost. (MOCM) In the computations 
below, the operations cost is 10% of the development cost per year.  
VI. Resupply life cycle cost for a 200-day high reliability mission 
Table 9 shows the full Life Cycle Cost (LCC) for resupply for a 200-day high reliability mission. It shows the 
hardware development, launch, operations, and total costs for the LiOH resupply containers, oxygen tanks, and 
water tanks. The cost is in million dollars per crewmember, $M/CM.  
 
Table 9. LCC for resupply for a 200-day high reliability mission.  
Mission duration, days 200 Totals, $M/CM % AMCM	parameter	 LiOH canisters Oxygen tanks Water tanks     Q	 Quantity	 52 6 10   M	 Container	mass,	lb	 3.1 27.9 46.6   M	 Container	mass,	kg	 1.4 12.7 21.2   S	 Specification	 2.13 2.13 2.13   IOC	 Initial	date	 2030 2030 2030   B	 Block	 7 20 2   D	 Difficulty	 -3 -3 -3   Hardware	development	cost,	$M/CM	 7 6 25    
Total development cost, 1999 M dollars 38     
Inflation factor, 1999 to 2018 1.53     
Total development cost 58 72 Filled	container	mass	each,	kg	 7.0 48.1 124.2    Filled	container	mass	total,	kg	 364 289 1,242    
Total launch mass, kg 1,895     
Launch cost, $/kg 10,000     
Total Launch cost 19 24 
Operations cost 3 4 
Life Cycle Cost 80  
 
The resupply hardware development costs are produced directly by the AMCM in 1999 dollars. The AMCM 
quantity, Q, mass, M, and block, B, differ for the three types of resupply. The quantities, Q, depend on the 
reliability requirement, as shown in Table 6, and are those needed for Pr(LOC) < 0.001. The empty container 
masses, M, that determine development cost are given above. The specification, S, initial operation capability 
date, IOC, and difficulty, D, are the same for the three types of resupply. The specification, S, is 2.13 for a human 
habitat. A Mars base would have a higher specification and cost. The IOC date was set to 2030. The resupply 
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storage systems have all been flight proven. The resupply difficulty was set to -3, very extremely easy, for the 
future moon base. This is below the prescribed AMCM minimum of -2.5, but -3 seems more appropriate because 
of the very extremely easy technology of gas pressure tanks, water tanks, and material containers.  
LiOH has been primary on all human missions except Skylab and ISS, so counting Mercury, Gemini, Apollo 
transit and lander, shuttle, and spacelab, the block, B, is estimated at 7. (Wieland, 1994, p. 281) The Shuttle had 
twenty-four internal gas pressure vessels, many of different design, but the technology has been improved. The 
ISS has thirteen different types of on-board pressure vessels, some in multiple copies. Orbital ATK has produced 
20 different pressure vessels for space use. (Jones, 2017-89) The oxygen tank block, B, is estimated at 20. Water 
tanks have been used on all human missions but designs have changed. The block, B, is estimated at 2, assuming 
a second generation ISS design. (Wieland, 1994, p. 281)  
The hardware development costs include all the LiOH canisters and oxygen and water tanks for a 200-day 
mission. The 1999 to 2018 inflation correction has been applied. (CPI Inflation Calculator) Launch cost is 
computed based on the filled container launch mass. The filled container masses are given above. The launch cost 
is set at $10,000/kg, based on the Falcon Heavy cost of $1,400/kg and Mars average gear ratio of about 7. The 
operations cost is estimated at 10% of the development cost of the containers.  
The total estimated cost for resupply life support for a 200-day mission with Pr(LOC) < 0.001is 80 million 
dollars per crewmember. Development cost accounts for 72%, launch cost 24%, and operations cost 4%. The 
resupply costs for higher reliability, Pr(LOC) < 0.0001 and 0.00001, were calculated similarly and are given later.  
VII. Recycling life cycle cost for a 200-day high reliability mission  
Table 8 shows the full Life Cycle Cost (LCC) computation for resupply on a 200-day high reliability mission. 
It shows the hardware development, launch, operations and total costs for the recycling systems; carbon dioxide 
removal, carbon dioxide reduction, oxygen generation, water processing, and urine processing for a 200-day 
mission. The cost is in million dollars per crewmember, $M/CM.  
 
Table 8. LCC for recycling for a 200-day high reliability mission.  
Mission duration, days 200 Totals, $M/CM % 
AMCM parameter 
carbon 
dioxide 
removal 
carbon 
dioxide 
reduction 
oxygen 
generation 
water 
processing 
urine 
processing   
Q Quantity 2.91 3.05 3.04 2.97 3.27   
M 
Hardware mass, 
lb 110.7 9.9 35.4 104.7 35.2   
M 
Hardware mass, 
kg 50.3 4.5 16.1 47.6 16.0   
S Specification 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13   
IOC Initial date 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030   
B Block 2 2 2 2 2   
D Difficulty 1 1 1 1 1   
 Hardware development 
cost, $M/CM 128 27 62 125 65    
Total development cost, 1999 M dollars 407    
Inflation factor, 1999 to 2018 1.53     
Total development cost 622 94 
Total hardware mass 
each, kg 146.4 13.7 48.9 141.4 52.3   
Total launch mass, kg 403     
Launch cost, $/kg 10,000     
Total launch cost 4 1 
Operations cost 34 5 
Life Cycle Cost 660   
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The recycling hardware development costs are produced directly by the AMCM in 1999 dollars. The 
recycling system hardware mass per crewmember, M, is obtained from Table 7. The quantities, Q, depend on the 
reliability requirement, as shown in Table 8, and are those needed for Pr(LOC) < 0.001. The quantities are not 
integers but decimals, reflecting the mass weighted average number of redundant ORUs. The actual numbers of 
ORUs must be integers, but the decimal overall system level of redundancy was used to better reflect the cost 
than would using the nearest integer. The specification, S, initial operation capability date, IOC, block, B, and 
difficulty, D, are the same for all the recycling systems. The specification, S, is 2.13 for a human habitat. The IOC 
date was set to 2030. The hardware block, B, was set to 2, second generation, assuming that the systems would be 
based on the ISS designs. Recycling physical-chemical technology is not especially difficult space technology. 
The recycling development difficulty was set to 1, more than average, for a high reliability system. The inflation 
correction, launch cost, and development are computed as in the previous table.  
The total estimated cost for recycling life support for a 200 day mission with Pr(LOC) < 0.001is 660 billion 
dollars per crewmember. Development cost accounts for 94%, operations cost for 5%, and launch cost 1%. The 
recycling costs for higher reliability, Pr(LOC) <0.0001 and 0.00001, were calculated similarly and are given later.  
VIII. Comparing the life cycle costs of high reliability 200-day resupply and recycling 
As seen by comparing Tables 8 and 9 for a high reliability 200-day mission, the cost of recycling at $660 M/CM 
is about 8 times higher than resupply at about $80 M/CM. For both resupply and recycling, the development cost is 
significant at 72 and 94%. The launch cost is significant for resupply, 24%, but negligible for recycling, 1%. The 
operations cost is 4 or 5%, reflecting the short 200 day mission duration. 
These costs are for a Pr(LOC) < 0.001 for every subsystem. Table 10 shows the total costs for Pr(LOC) < 0.001, 
0.0001, and 0.00001for every subsystem for resupply and recycling. 
 
Table 10. Total costs for resupply and recycling with Pr(LOC) < 0.001, 0.0001, and 0.00001for every subsystem. 
Pr(LOC) < Reliability > Resupply LCC, $M/CM Recycling LCC, $M/CM 
0.001 0.999 80 660 
0.0001 0.9999 83 740 
0.00001 0.99999 85 802 
 
Reliability is defined as 1 – Pr(LOC), the probability that the crew will survive. It is 3, 4 or 5 9’s as redundancy 
is increased. The cost of increasing reliability is small for resupply and storage, since several high reliability 
containers are used for each material and adding a few more causes only a relatively small increase in cost. The 
higher reliability resupply and storage systems cost little more than a single thread, nonredundant system.  
The higher reliability recycling systems are triple or quadruple redundant, a single thread plus two or three 
spares of each ORU. The higher reliability recycling systems cost three or four times more than a single thread, 
nonredundant system. The lower reliability of recycling ORUs compared to storage containers causes the recycling 
cost to increase faster than the resupply cost for higher reliability. A low reliability, single thread recycling system 
would cost one third or one fourth of a high reliability redundant system, but would still cost much more than a 
resupply system.  
IX. Conclusion  
High reliability life support is required for missions where rapid emergency resupply or crew return to a safe 
location are not possible. Examples include travel to and from Mars, a Mars base, and a solar orbiting space 
platform. In these cases, high reliability life support would be required for 100’s of days and a 200-day mission 
duration was used to compute the redundancy required and its cost for reliability corresponding to a subsystem 
Pr(LOC) of < 0.001, 0.0001, and 0.00001. It was found that resupply had nearly an order of magnitude lower cost 
than recycling. This is directly due to the higher reliability and lower cost of storage containers compared to active 
recycling components. An important external factor is the new lower launch costs to LEO, a reduction to 1/10 or 
1/20 of shuttle costs. Multiplying the launch costs by 20 would make resupply nearly as expensive as recycling. The 
final factor to be mentioned is the relatively short duration, 200 days, of the high reliability requirement missions. 
Resupply is better for short missions, as its small daily cost accumulates directly with time, while recycling is better 
for long missions, when its high initial cost can be paid off over time. Comparisons of resupply and recycling based 
only on reliability and cost usually favor resupply, regardless of the mission or duration. Recycling systems like the 
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one on ISS have been the focus of research and development for more than fifty years, and similar systems are 
expected to be used in the future. Recycling reduces mass and launch cost and increases closure and independence 
from Earth. Continued research and development in life support recycling seems worthwhile, but could focus more 
on replacing resupply in specific missions.  
Appendix A: Required spares for a recycling life support system 
This appendix calculates the number of spares needed to have less than a 0.001, 0.0001, or 0.00001 probability 
of not having a needed spare, for each of the major ISS life support subsystems. If all failures can be repaired using 
spares, the Pr(LOC) due to any system failure would simply be the probability of not having a needed spare.  
A. Oxygen Generation System (OGS) MTBFs, redundancy, and failure probability. 
Table A.1 gives the OGS subsystem MTBFs, mass, and required subsystem redundancy for an overall system 
probability of less than 0.001 of not having a needed spare.  
 
Table A.1. OGS ORU MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and spares mass.  
Acronym Full name MTBF, hours MADS mass, kg 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
Hydrogen ORU Hydrogen Pressure dome 29,551 125.2 3 0.000633 
Controller Process Controller 75,677 37.1 3 0.000041 
O ORU Oxygen Outlet 99,252 32.7 3 0.000018 
Pump ORU Pump 189,433 10.5 3 0.000003 
Inlet DI Bed ORU Inlet Deionizing Bed 442,487 20.0 2 0.000058 
Nitrogen Purge 
ORU Nitrogen Purge 140,195 23.2 3 0.000007 
PSM Power Supply Module 49,202 46.6 3 0.000144 
Water ORU Water 37,885 34.6 4 0.000010 
  Single system mass, kg   330.0   0.000913 
  System and spares mass, kg     1,004.6    
  
Mass weighted average number 
of spares     3.04   
 
The Hydrogen Sensor and ACTEX are not included. The ISS Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS, 2015) 
gives the estimated MTBFs before flight data was acquired. Some ORUS have performed worse than expected but it 
is assumed that redesign efforts will restore the originally expected reliability. The failure probability for each 
MTBF and number of spares was computed using the Poisson distribution. Most ORU’s require 3 spares, and the 
mass weighted average number of spares is 3.04 for a failure probability of 0.000913, less than 0.001. A similar 
calculation shows that the mass weighted average number of spares is 3.74 for a failure probability of less than 
0.0001 and 4.39 for a failure probability of less than 0.00001.  
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B. Carbon Dioxide Removal System (CDRA) MTBFs, redundancy, and failure probability.  
Table A.2 gives the CDRA subsystem MTBFs, mass, and required subsystem redundancy for an overall system 
probability of less than 0.001 of not having a needed spare.  
 
Table A.2. CDRA MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and spares mass.  
Full name BVAD MTBF, hours 
BVAD 
mass, kg 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
Air Pump Two-Stage ORU 156,200 10.9 2 0.000463 
Blower 129,700 5.6 3 0.000008 
Check Valves   39.9 3 0.000018 
Desiccant Beds 77,100 42.6 3 0.000038 
Heat Controller 242,700 3.3 3 0.000001 
Precooler 129,700 5.6 3 0.000008 
Pump Fan Motor Controller 2,272,000 2.7 2 0.000002 
Selector Valves 117,000 3.0 3 0.000011 
Sorbent Beds (Zeolite) 77,100 42.6 3 0.000038 
Single system mass, kg   156.3   0.000588 
System and spares mass, kg   455.3    
Mass weighted average number of spares   2.91   
The MTBFs are from the BVAD. (Hanford, 2004). Most ORU’s require 3 spares, and the mass weighted average 
number of spares is 2.91 for a failure probability of 0.000588, less than 0.001. A similar calculation shows that the 
mass weighted average number of spares is 3.36 for a failure probability of less than 0.0001 and 3.89 for a failure 
probability of less than 0.00001.  
C. Carbon Dioxide Reduction System (CRS) redundancy. 
No data was found for the CRS MTBFs. The number of spares assigned is 3.05, which is the average number of 
spares for the other recycling subsystems.  
D. Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) MTBFs, redundancy, and failure probability. 
Table A.3 gives the UPA subsystem MTBFs, mass, and required subsystem redundancy for an overall system 
probability of less than 0.001 of not having a needed spare. 
 
Table A.3. UPA MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and spares mass.  
Acronym Full name MADS MTBF, hours 
MADS 
mass, kg 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
WSTA Wastewater Storage Tank Assembly 82,200 47.9 3 0.000032 
FCA Firmware Controller Assembly 13,453 24.1 4 0.000508 
SPA Separator Plumbing Assembly 88,993 16.3 3 0.000025 
PCPA Pressure Control and Pump Assembly 59,221 44.9 3 0.000084 
DA Distillation Assembly 41,376 75.7 3 0.000239 
FCPA Fluids Control and Pump Assembly 22,759 45.7 4 0.000070 
  Single system mass, kg   254.5   0.000957 
 System and spares mass, kg   833.4    
 Mass weighted average number of spares   3.27   
 
The Recycle Filter Tank Assembly is not included in the ORUs mass. The MTBFs are from the ISS Maintenance 
& Analysis Data Set. (MADS, 2015) Most ORU’s require 3 spares, and the mass weighted average number of spares 
is 3.27 for a failure probability of 0.000957, less than 0.001. A similar calculation shows that the mass weighted 
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average number of spares is 4.09 for a failure probability of less than 0.0001 and 4.64 for a failure probability of less 
than 0.00001.  
E. Water Processor Assembly (WPA) MTBFs, redundancy, and failure probability.  
Table A.4 gives the WPA subsystem MTBFs, mass, and required subsystem redundancy for an overall system 
probability of less than 0.001 of not having a needed spare. 
 
Table A.4. WPA MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and spares mass.  
Acronym Full name MADS MTBF, hours 
MADS 
mass, kg 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
CR Catalytic Reactor 27,077 57.5 4 0.000036 
GS Gas Separator 61,182 39.4 3 0.000076 
IX Ion Exchange Bed 442,478 12.0 2 0.000058 
MCV Microbial Check Valve 178,447 3.7 3 0.000003 
MFB Multifiltration Bed #1 349,650 50.5 2 0.000093 
MFB Multifiltration Bed #2 349,650 50.5 2 0.000093 
PF Particulate Filter  560,695 26.8 2 0.000036 
  pH Adjuster          
PC Process Controller  70,745 36.9 3 0.000049 
PS Pump Separator  39,429 27.6 4 0.000008 
RHS Reactor Health Sensor  134,077 8.6 3 0.000007 
S Sensor  184,618 3.6 3 0.000003 
SF Separator Filter  642,342 7.3 2 0.000028 
  Start-up Filter  226,850 9.5 3 0.000002 
WD Water Delivery  81,797 39.2 3 0.000032 
WW Waste Water 43,669 87.5 3 0.000204 
WS Water Storage 40,463 49.3 4 0.000008 
  Oxygen Filter 342,548 1.1 2 0.000097 
  Single system mass, kg   511.1   0.000835 
 System and spares mass, kg   1,519.7    
 Mass weighted average number of spares   2.97   
 
The External Filter is not included in the ORUs mass. The MTBFs are from the ISS Maintenance & Analysis 
Data Set. (MADS, 2015) Most ORU’s require 2 or  3 spares, and the mass weighted average number of spares is 
2.97 for a failure probability of less than 0.001. A similar calculation shows that the mass weighted average number 
of spares is 3.77 for a failure probability of less than 0.0001 and 4.12 for a failure probability of less than 0.00001.  
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